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Abstract 
The paper argues that sunk costs’ sensitivity can lead to the optimal consumption-leisure choice 
under price dispersion. The increase in quantity to be purchased with the extension of the time horizon of 
the consumption-leisure choice equalizes marginal costs of search with its marginal benefits. The implicit 
optimal choice results in the explicit satisficing decision. The transformation of cognitive mechanism of 
discouragement into satisficing happens only in the “common model” of consumer behavior. The paper 
argues that the cognitive mechanism of aspiration takes place when consumers try to get marginal 
savings on purchase greater than the wage rate and, therefore, they follow the “leisure model” of 
behavior where both the marginal utility of labor income and the marginal utility of consumption become 
negative. 
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1. Introduction 
The analysis of sunk costs usually have been followed by experimental studies, previewed 
by strong assumptions that “sunk cost effects on decision-making (were), of course, irrational 
from the perspective of both classical economic and normative decision theories.”(Garland and 
Newport 1991, p.55). However, there were some efforts to explain the phenomenon of sunk 
costs on the basis of economic rationality (McAfee et al. 2010).  
In 1980 R.Thaler attempted to point the way towards a positive theory of consumer choice 
on the basis of the prospect theory of D.Kahneman and A.Tversky (Thaler 1980). R.Thaler 
reviewed some issues that were considered inconsistent with economic theory. The analysis of 
that inconsistency included the endowment effect, the search for big-ticket items, and the sunk 
costs effect. This paper continues to argue that there are no inconsistencies and the standard tools 
of economic theory can explain all these effects that do require neither alternative descriptive 
theories nor specific utility functions. 
It was previously shown that the development of the G.Stigler’s marginal approach could 
reveal the general relationship between labor, search or home production, and leisure (Aguiar 
and Hurst 2007, Malakhov 2003).  Furthermore, that general relationship could retain a 
metaphorical methodological legacy of M.Friedman and L.J.Savage. Like billiards player, a 
consumer does not engage complicated calculations.  He just relies on his feelings and he takes a 
satisficing decision. And this satisficing decision automatically equalizes marginal costs of 
search with its marginal benefit (Malakhov 2012, 2013a,2013b), or:  
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w ∂L
∂S
= Q ∂P
∂S
(1)  
 
w – wage rate; L – labor time; S – time of search; ∂L/∂S<0 - propensity to search; Q – quantity to be 
purchased; ∂P/∂S<0 - price reduction in a given store.  
 
If we take this equation as the constraint, we can solve the implicit consumption-leisure 
utility maximization problem (max U(,Q) subject to Eq.1 gives the MRS (H for Q)=w/P0) for the 
following explicit satisficing decision (Fig.1): Шаг$43$if$wL/S=P/S$then$P0$–$T$
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Fig.1. Explicit satisficing decision  
wL(S) – labor income; QP(S) – expenditures on the chosen quantity; wL0 – reservation labor income; QPs – 
expenditures at the starting price; QPp – actual expenditures; QP0 – potential labor income {QP0=w(L+S)=-
T∂P/∂S}. 
 
The general relationship between labor, search, and leisure shows that standard tools of the 
economic marginal analysis can easily explain the paradox of little pre-purchase search for big-
ticket items (Malakhov 2012). Moreover, the explanation of this paradox represents only a part 
of the synthesis of the search-satisficing concept with the neoclassical paradigm. This synthesis 
also discovers microeconomic roots of the endowment effect. Indeed, this effect occurs because 
there is a difference between the actual labor income wL, spent on purchase, and the potential 
labor income w(L+S), where search costs wS increase the willingness to accept (Fig.1)1. 
The billiard metaphor represents also a basis for the understanding how the search-
satisficing procedure can incorporate the consumer sunk costs’ sensitivity. 
 
2. “Common” sunk costs’ sensitivity 
The C.Kogut’s study of consumer search behavior and sunk costs showed that individuals were 
making decisions based on the total return from searching, rather than simply the marginal return from 
another draw (Kogut 1990). The analysis of the search behavior can eliminate the difference between 
total and marginal estimates. Usually sunk costs are followed by a feeling of disappointment. If the 
problem is strictly constrained, this disappointment will expose the cognitive mechanism of 
discouragement. The discouragement is one of the mechanisms that result in goal termination (Simon 
1967). However, the nature of the problem of sunk costs by definition needs a relaxation of constraints 
because “this effect is manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in 
money, effort, or time has been made.” (Arkes and Blumer 1985, p.124). From the point of view of the 
search theory the discouragement means that the search has not been efficient and total losses are greater 
than total gains. This consideration can be written as |dwL(S)|>|dQP(S)|. However, any relaxation needs a 
marginal evaluation. And hence we can turn from the total discouragement to the marginal 
                                            
1 The analysis of the endowment effect needs a voluminous presentation of discussions on the WTP-WTA relationship. Readers, who are interesting in the 
development of the search model, can make this analysis themselves. Here it is only worth to pay attention to the point of departure, where the following 
Equation 4, taken for the value S=0, provides the equality WTP=WTA. 
 3 
disappointment (Fig.2; Eq.2) 2: 
Шаг$43$if$wL/S=P/S$then$P0$–$T$
S
wL0
QPp
T
QP
S
QP0
L
wL(S)
QP(S)
dwL(S) > dQP(S) ;
w dS ∂L
∂S
>Q dS ∂P
∂S
; (2)
w ∂L
∂S
>Q ∂P
∂S
 
dwL(S) > dQP(S) ;
w dS ∂L
∂S
> Q dS ∂P
∂S
(2)
w ∂L
∂S
> Q ∂P
∂S
 
 
Fig.2. Explicit suboptimal disappointing decision 
 
The inequality (2) states the fact that for the given price reduction ∂P/∂S, i.e., in the given store, the 
absolute value of marginal loss is greater than the absolute value of marginal benefit. We cannot 
rationalize our purchase of the chosen quantity in the chosen store. Simply, the price in this store for the 
chosen quantity seems “insufficiently interesting”.  But it might be satisficing for the greater quantity. 
The greater quantity may be either explicit, and we buy more potatoes, or implicit, if we come back to the 
J.Stiglitz’s notation that “a good x which lasts twice as long as a good y (if the interest rate is zero) is just 
equal to two units of y” (Stiglitz 1979, p.342), and the “insufficiently interesting” price corresponds to a 
higher quality and to a longer product’s lifecycle.  
The J.Stiglitz’s notation shows the way where the phenomenon of sunk costs’ sensitivity appears. 
Consumers increase quantity to be purchased in order to recover fixed sunk costs of visiting the store. 
“The buyer’s sunk travel costs may be exploited…In this case, because the cost of the extra trip may not 
be worth it, the consumer may still buy other items from the retailer…” (Ratchword 2009, p.56). 
However, if we consider the consistent buyer who does not change his intensity of consumption, we have 
to follow the J.Stiglitz’s notation and we should agree that the increase in quantity changes the time 
horizon of the consumption-leisure choice. Consumers leave the maximum of the current consumption-
leisure utility and they look for another maximum with the new time horizon. Again, this shift does not 
represent calculations of marginal values of search. The choice of another maximum represents the 
implicit process of the explicit way out from disappointment. 
However, the increase in quantity to be purchased changes the marginal values of search. The 
change in the absolute value of the marginal benefit is obvious: 
∂Q | ∂P / ∂S |
∂Q
= ∂P
∂S
> 0 (3)  
The increase in quantity to be purchased raises the absolute value of the marginal benefit of search. 
However, the change in the value of marginal costs of search is not so evident. Here we should come 
back to the properties of the “common model” of search behavior (Malakhov 2012, 2013a): 
 
w ∂L
∂S
= -w L +S
T
⇒w ∂L
∂S
= w L +S
T
(4)  
 
                                            
2 Absolute values do not change the logic of the problem and they are taken here only for the simplicity of presentation. 
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The increase in consumption gives us the following: 
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Then we can simplify the expression in parentheses, keeping in mind that being disappointed by 
the given price reduction, the consumer decides to buy goods not only for this week but also for the next 
week in order not to travel to the store next Saturday (∂S/∂Q=0):  
 
e
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The decision to buy more changes neither the price and price reduction nor the intensity of 
consumption Q/H. Therefore, the increase in labor time as well as the increase in leisure time should be 
proportional to the increase in quantity to be purchased, or eL,Q =1 and eH,Q =1. However, it is easy to 
show that the proportional increase in labor time (eL,Q =1) as well as in leisure time (eH,Q =1) give us 
e(L+H),Q =1. And from the Eq.5,6, and Eq.7 we have: 
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or the increase in consumption decreases the absolute value of marginal costs of search. This means that 
the increase in quantity to be purchased moves the marginal values of search in opposite directions 
(Eq.3 and Eq.8) until the moment when disappointment vanishes and the inequality (2) takes the form of 
the key equation (1). And this equation means that the consumer maximizes the consumption-leisure 
utility on its new level for a new time horizon (Fig.4, Eq.9): 
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Fig.4. Explicit satisficing decision for the extended time horizon T(Q) 
 
3. “Leisure” sunk costs’ sensitivity 
The “common model” of behavior presumes that the absolute value of marginal savings on 
purchase is less than the wage rate  (w>Q|∂P/∂S;|). This inequality results in the common redistribution 
of time where search displaces both labor time and leisure time from the given time horizon, like ice 
displaces both whiskey and soda in the glass (L+S+H=T; ∂L/∂S+1+∂H/∂S=0; -1<∂L/∂S<0; ∂H/∂S<0). 
However, when the absolute value of marginal savings becomes greater than the wage rate, the marginal 
utility of labor income becomes negative (MUw=λ<0) (Malakhov 2013a). Moreover, the inequality 
(w<Q|∂P/∂S|) changes the redistribution of time. According to the key equation of the search model (1), 
the absolute value of the propensity to search becomes greater than one, |∂L/∂S|>1, or ∂L/∂S<-1. The 
“price of leisure” becomes greater than the wage rate. And whatever the time horizon we choose, we will 
always get the positive leisure-search relationship (∂H/∂S>0). However, the positive leisure-search 
relationship results in the positive consumption-leisure relationship (∂H/∂S>0; ∂Q/∂H>0) (Malakhov 
2011,2013a). And with regard to the negative marginal utility of labor income (MUw=λ<0) consumption 
becomes “bad”. The negative marginal utility of labor income makes the marginal utility of the absolute 
value of price reduction ∂U/∂|∂P/∂S| positive. If the prices’ search itself has the diminishing marginal 
efficiency (∂P/∂S<0; ∂2P/∂S2>0), the greater absolute value of price reduction |∂P/∂S| corresponds to the 
higher price. And as far as the marginal utility of price reduction is positive, or ∂U/∂|∂P/∂S|>0, the 
Veblen effect takes place (Fig.5): 
 
 
Illustra(on+of+Veblen+eﬀect:+
+price+growth+increases+consump(on+
T"
 
Fig.5. Veblen effect and “leisure” sunk costs 
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Here, the only way to compensate the high price is to increase leisure time in order to depreciate 
the purchase of the big-ticket item. If we substitute the search by the home production, we will get the 
same result.3 
The purchase of big-ticket items clarifies the behavioral difference between the “common model” 
and the “leisure model”.  In the “common model” consumers can choose the big-ticket item of higher 
quality and with guarantees. That makes it more expensive but the recalculation of the time horizon, i.e., 
of the big-ticket item’s lifecycle, as well as the recalculation and the subsequent increase in labor time 
keeps the consumption-leisure choice within the “common model”. The procedure described by the 
inequalities (3) and (8) makes the high price acceptable. And the explicit form of this rational implicit 
decision really looks satisficing, like it was well presented by Kapteyn et al. in 1979. 
The foundation of the “common model” is very strong because it is based on the natural rule of the 
redistribution of time.  When the share of leisure in the time horizon H/T determines leisure-search 
relationship (dH(S)=dS×∂H/∂S=dS×(-H/T), and ∂H/∂S=-H/T), the propensity to search ∂L/∂S can be 
determined by the very simple equation (4) and it gets the negative derivative, or ∂2L/∂S2<0. This 
derivative of propensity to search provides the resolution of many microeconomic phenomena along the 
Cobb-Douglas consumption-leisure utility curve U(Q,H) = Q-∂L/∂SH-∂H/∂S in the same manner like physical 
laws provide correct intuition of billiards players.  
But it is not true for the “leisure model” of behavior. The Cobb-Douglas curve disappears. There is 
no natural equivalent to the redistribution of time under the positive leisure-search ∂H/∂S>0 relationship. 
And we cannot determine exactly the depreciation rule for either high price or excess consumption under 
such extension of leisure time. Indeed, “once individuals have made a large sunk investment, they have a 
tendency to invest more in an attempt to prevent their previous investment from being wasted. The 
greater the size of their sunk investment, the more they tend to invest further, even when the return on 
additional investment does not seem worthwhile.” (McAfee et al., pp.324). Once the Chateau Lafite 
Rothschild 1995 from Pauillac is bought for the party, it will need something like the Opus XA from 
Arturo Fuente in order to make cigars “well-matched” with the good wine. And the leisurely manner of 
consumption of good wine with good cigars definitely makes the party longer. 
4. Conclusion 
The implicit increase in quantity to be purchased, i.e., the choice of the big-ticket item of high 
quality with longer lifecycle, makes the satisficing as well as the optimal decision of the depreciation of 
sunk costs more transparent if we take into account the interest rate. If we presuppose that the interest rate 
r increases prices of durables and therefore the absolute value of the marginal savings on purchase |∂P/∂S| 
and if the interest rate r does not change the intensity of consumption, the behavior of marginal values of 
search under the implicit increase in consumption and with regard to the interest rate makes the present 
dissatisfying decision to be satisficing as well as optimal from the prospective point of view due to the 
increase in the absolute value of marginal savings and to the decrease in the absolute value of marginal 
losses (Eq.3, Eq.8). In this manner the interest rate contributes to the recovery of the sunk costs of search. 
The “common” sunk costs could be depreciated in the other manner, for example, by the decrease 
in the intensity of consumption Q/H. However, the decrease in the intensity of consumption under the 
“common model” is voluntary and controlled when it expresses the planned careful use of the big-ticket 
item and it considerably diminishes the absolute value of marginal losses (eL,Q<e(L+H),Q ; 
∂w|∂L/∂S|/∂Q<<0). Conversely, if a consumer looks for the marginal savings greater than his wage rate 
(w<Q|∂P/S|), he recovers “leisure” sunk costs when the increase in consumption-leisure utility is possible 
only with the obligatory decrease in the intensity of consumption (Fig.5). There, the decision to increase 
the intensity of consumption immediately discovers the “bad” economic nature of the chosen item. 
It looks like a paradox that only for examples like Chateau Lafite Rothschild 1995 - Opus XA 
Arturo Fuente as well as for many other cases of the “leisure model” of behavior we can definitely talk 
about aspiration as the cognitive mechanism of the goal termination. The properties of the model of 
behavior of Economic Man seem not to be compatible with the “common model” of behavior. Either 
Economic Man can perfectly calculate his consumption-leisure ratio and he can choose anytime the store 
where the price reduction corresponds to his intensity of consumption (∂P/∂S=∂P/∂S(Q); ∂P/∂S = 
∂P/∂S(H)) and consumption and leisure become perfect complements, or he is a vulgar maximizer. 
                                            
3 The analysis of “leisure model” with regard to the home production illustrates well the irrational shortened labor supply in agrarian economics, which expose the 
Chayanov’s backward bending effect (see, for example, Shanin 1986). 
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Indeed, he does not need a calculator to compare the wage rate with savings on purchase. He simply tries 
to find an opportunity to get from the search more than from the labor (w<Q|∂P/S|), when he can be 
really insatiable. However, the purchase could be unplanned and the table tennis, bought occasionally at 
sales, really becomes “bad” as the “easy come” item and it can take its right place in a month in the 
garage. There, being got out to the open air once in a season, it will serve for years, or it will be presented 
at garage sales as the real “easy go” item. 
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